

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-VS-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

Affidavit

Deponent: Yamaoka, Shigeatsu

1. I am ex-Lt. General Yamaoka, Shigeatsu. I now leading a retired life at 205 Kodaki, Oasa, Zentsujimachi, Kagawa Prefecture.
2. I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in February, 1933 after the accused ARAKI had occupied the portfolio of War, who resigned from his position on account of his illness in January, 1934. I also left my post in March of the same year.
3. The Manchurian policies of the War Ministry of the Inugai Cabinet aimed at restoration of peace and order, and the earliest cessation of hostilities, in Manchuria. It devoted itself to realization of these policies. The succeeding Saito Cabinet followed almost the same policies and tried to realize them in accordance with Manchukuo's free will and with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol after her recognition as a state in view of the realities in Manchukuo.
4. Though the Army continued some military operations there, it took every caution not to allow them to become a full-scale war. Expeditionary forces were sent there as on a peace-time occasion and their scope of activity was limited as closely as possible, though on a Cabinet decision it might be extended, if necessary, to all the area formerly controlled by the Changs but now in a state of anarchy, in order to protect our residents, rights and interests.
5. The establishment of Manchukuo had been decided and declared when I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. The Government approved the opinion of the Commander of the Kwantung Army that there was no other way but to leave the natives to realize their ardent wishes, in order to secure peace and order. The Government decided not to interfere with it. The Army, in accordance with the principles

of the Government and with the War Minister's intentions, made efforts to cease fire at the earliest date possible and to maintain peace and order. A commission was formed in the Cabinet with the chief cabinet secretary as chairman and other committees from the ministries concerned, for the purpose of deliberating counter-measures.

In view of disgraceful affairs in the Army, such as the March Incident, the October Incident and so forth, we had strictly to prevent the repetition of such incidents for the future. That was the chief reason why I was appointed to the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. At my holding the post, the Minister of war told me to make, above all things, the Imperial Army display its real value, keeping order and never allowing its quality to be affected by Prussian type or the then-popular Fascism.

6. In those days the War Ministry was, on Minister ARAKI's principle, to transfer to comparatively unimportant posts those who had been concerned with the incidents or who were too indignant at the current situation and to appoint to important posts those officers of sound character who could fully understand the Minister's intentions and would carry them out. I accordingly cooperated with him since my acceptance of the post by renovating the personnel affairs and by appeasing and persuading some young officers and indignant elements.
7. As a result, no army officer, happy to say, participated in the May 15 Incident which took place in the third month of my installation. But some students of the military academy, led from outside, were involved in the affairs. That night I hurried to the official residence of the Premier by order of the Minister of War, and succeeded in preventing aggravation of the incident by controlling the much-excited Army and frenzied local civilians at this great shock, without promulgating martial law, though there were some who advocated it.

The Minister of War resigned his office assuming administrative responsibility for the incident, in which military academy students participated, though any military officer did not. As his successor, the three superior officers recommended Gen. Hayashi Commander of the Korean Army, who, however, refused it to the Premier on the ground that he had not yet been well informed of the prevailing situation, as he had been away from home.

Then Premier Saito so earnestly asked Mr. Araki to resume the post for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident that he at last consented against his first intentions. Minister Araki however, was accused vehemently of his resumption of his post by those who misunderstood the incident and who had hitherto been in sympathy with his principles. But without any word of his own justification and only citing an old saying, "Blame comes even upon our efforts for perfect achievement, while praise is bestowed unexpectedly," he was doing his best for settlement of the Manchurian Incident. At this sublime attitude of his, I, as one of his subordinates who knew the real state of things, was moved to tears.



8. Let me state the situation prevailing in Manchuria and others at the time I held office. A cleaning campaign of communists and a northern expedition by Chiang Kai-Shek in China had been conducted. But the people's wishes for restoration of sovereignty were so ardent that an anti-foreign movement was strongly launched in Manchuria which had been rather disorderly and not yet in its frontier districts peace and order were kept. We could not be off our guard even for a moment, especially as the masses were under constant agitation of Chang Hsueh-Liang and the Kuomintang. Moreover Soviet Union's Far Eastern equipment was being established steadily, which meant also threats for us. But Minister Araki who had no intentions to wage war, wanted to stop military operations in Manchuria as soon as possible. Such being his policy, a great deal of pains and devices were required in settling the incident for maintenance of peace and order, for the military forces there could not be moved so easily at our will.

For instance, our General Staff Office was troubled regarding expedition against revolts of Ma Chan-Shan in North Manchuria and Su Ping-Wen in Hulunbeirh. Both of them could not be decidedly attacked or annihilated.

9. After recognition of Manchukuo, the Army had to share unlike before with Manchukuo responsibilities of national defence and maintenance of peace and order in accordance with the new circumstances. It had to arrange matters with Manchukuo. Therefore every thing was settled by agreements between both countries. Such being the case, the Army asked the Government, as regards its Manchurian policies, to take full measures necessary for her national defence and maintenance of peace and order, for the foundation of her state had not yet been stabilized. The detailed measures were discussed by the authorities of the Foreign, the Navy, the Finance Offices and the Cabinet. The making of plans and the proceedings of their enforcement resulted from the discussions were in charge of the Foreign Office, only manipulation of troops was in the hands of the Army.
10. The Minister's principle of non-aggravation of the Manchurian Incident and immediate cessation of hostilities demonstrated his long-cherished spirit of the Imperial Army. He believed and carried out that the Japanese Army should avoid war, because it existed to preserve the national character in accordance with His august benevolence of the Emperor, and that even when it was compelled to wage a defensive war it should avoid its disaster by limiting damages on both parties as strictly as possible. At the first Shanghai Affairs he evacuated all the troops upon truce to eradicate the root of calamity in future. It was the Kwantung Army fulfilling the fervent orders of Minister of War Araki Prince Kan-in, Chief of the General Staff. General Staff Mazaki that succeeded in concluding the Tangku Truce Agreement and finally

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settling the Manchurian Incident by making our troops withdraw even twice to the Great Wall line though they had marched in full sight of Peiping and Tientsin at the Jehol campaign. It took one year and a half since his assumption of the portfolio to complete settling the incident. From a professional point of view none could achieve a more brilliant result under the Manchurian, Japanese and international situations prevailing in those days.

11. The Minister devoted himself to cessation of hostilities till the Tangku Truce Agreement, after which he set about planning fundamental national policies. Early in that autumn he began to discuss external, agricultural and political issues at Five Ministers' Conferences. He composed a gist of national policies entitled "My Suggestions for Emergency Policies" through which he exerted himself to the utmost to arrange internally to grant amnesty to all the rightist and leftist criminals excluding habitual ones, and internationally to hold a Far Eastern Peace Conference with a view to securing peace in the Far East by asking the Powers to recognize the existing conditions and adjusting Japan's relations with them after her withdrawal from the League of Nations.
12. But he fell ill with pneumonia on January 1, 1934. Tiding over its crisis, he still feared he could not take active part at an emergency session of the Diet after his illness. On that account, despite the earnest persuasion to remain in office by the Premier, other ministers and us his subordinates, he resigned it recommending as his successor General Hayashi who had some understanding with him about his gist of national policies.
13. The Government, however, including Minister of War Hayashi, neglected his suggestions without trying to realize them. Moreover the session of the Diet was again at a low ebb and even presented a shameful scene. Thereupon Mr. Aoki, returning to Tokyo from his one month recuperation at Irami, was not only deeply disappointed but got angry. Since then he never expressed his opinion actively regarding any important national policy.
14. Minister of War Araki always talked of disasters of civilized warfare seen in World War I. He had his own view of war and armament for national defence, and was not much interested in ordinary military equipment in general. He asserted that national defence should be based on high standards of morality. Japanese history abounded in such instances and security of national defence was not always war but improvement of morality, he said. He advocated a humanitarian view of war, by preventing disasters, observing war-time public law and citing behaviors of great war lords of Japan, such as Uesugi, Kenshin. With this in view, he tried to have our armaments as an independent state almost on the same level with those of other Powers during World War I. For our poor Army, armaments had lagged far behind those of

of other Powers during World War I. The plans made in 1922-23 were followed but the Incident interfered with their realization. On the other hand, the urgent expenses of the Incident was met by advancing the already settled budget. He devoted himself solely in settling the Incident before anything else. He could not realize his ideals in other matters, nor paid much attention to suggestions made by his subordinates. He waited for a time when his ideals and such suggestions could be realized. But his illness made him give them up. Though the Army received many reports about the Soviet Union's active installation in Far East, we did not have any special equipment, devoting ourselves solely in settling the Manchurian Incident. The Minister had his own faith and hope about inviting peace in his anxiety of world situation after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. So he did not take any active installation.

15. One of the Chief renovations of military administration while he was Minister of War was creation of a cadet system, discontinuing the one year volunteers system. The object of this renovation was equal opportunity for military service, because by the latter system an able but poor conscript could not apply for cadetship, as he had to pay an adequate money for the service year. Another renovation was an appointment of commanders from a standpoint of character, and payment of additional salary to those commanders who were company or higher commanders in a regiment and who had so many subordinates but no good chance for their culture and study, with a view to getting them devoted solely in military duties freed from anxiety about their future. As it was during the incident, any other renovation could not afford to be carried out.
16. Minister Araki's guiding principle of the Army was realization of an army as a moral existence. That is to say; from his experiences in World War I, the Japanese Army should earnestly try to prevent war from deterioration, wage no war without cause, commit no atrocities on a battlefield, nor treat war prisoners cruelly. Regarding these points, not only should we observe international treaties, but further we should warn the world without reserve against researches of poison gas or bacteria warfare, proposing limitation of any arms which were liable to cause deformity. So he said and practised. His motto in guiding the Army was, "Never be resented by enemies in victory and be yearned after by natives during your stay." He also strongly insisted upon sanctification of arms, but it could not be realized so easily impeded by the deeply-rooted evil of custom. A sword was, in his opinion, not for killing but for protection of its bearer's life. Therefore he rejected a blood-stained sword as impure and was always wearing a new sword never smeared with blood.
17. As to military training at school, Minister Araki did not take any other new measure than he rectified what had been formal and conventional in it. He



dispelled various misunderstanding lying between the Army and schools, clarified that military training of schools aimed at spiritual recognition of our Army as a moral existence to display its real merits, and rationalized it to be auxiliary training for military service with a view to shortening the service period. Minister Araki took others' speeches and publications as the public opinion and made use of them for his self-introspection. He never suppressed any speech, so that we, subordinates of his, even got angry at his leniency over personal abuses or slanders upon the Army made by civilians with varied objects. As far as I remember, the Press Section under his principle never resorted to any authoritative suppression policy, but settled matters persuadingly and with good will with those who had been too radical.

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通商口際耳事裁判所

亞米利加合衆口其他

對

荒木貞夫 其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 山 岡 重 厚

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ヅ別紙ノ

通り宣誓ヲ爲シタル上次ノ如ク供述致シマ

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一 私ハ元陸軍中將山岡重厚デアリマス 唯今香川縣  
善通寺町大麻字小澁二〇五番地ニ閑居シテ何モシ  
テ居リマセン

ニ 私ハ荒木大將ガ陸軍大臣就任後一九三二年（昭和  
七年）二月末陸軍省軍務局長ニナリ一九三四年一  
月荒木氏ガ病氣デ陸軍大臣ヲ兼任サレタ後同年三  
月軍務局長ノ地位ヲ去リマシタ

三 犬養内閣當時ノ陸軍省ノ對滿方針トシテハ唯滿洲  
ノ治安ノ恢復ト速カナル兵亂ノ終熄トラ目的トシ  
テ之ガ實現ニ専念致シマシタ

蕭條内閣ニ於ケル方針モ大体同様デアリマシタ

滿洲現地ノ實狀上滿洲國ヲ承認スルニ至リマシタ  
ノデ承認後ハ日滿議定書ニヨリ滿洲國ノ意志ヲ尊  
重シナガラ右目的ノ實現ヲ期シタノデアリマス

四、故ニ陸軍トシテハ治安ト國防トノ任務ノ上カラ兵  
力ヲ動かシテ居マシタガ大臣ハ事變ノ擴大トナラ  
ス様万事は注意サレマシテ派兵モ平時態勢ノ進行  
ハレ其行動地域モ我居習民ノ保護ヤ權益ノ擁護ノ  
タメニハ無政府狀態トナツタ舊張家ノ全支配下ノ  
地域ニ及ブ事モ已ムヲ得ナイトイフ内閣ノ決定ハ  
アリマシタガ之レサヘモ成ルベク擴大ヲ避ケテ行

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勳範圖ヲ局限スルヨウニ試シテ居リマシタ

三、滿洲建國ハ私ノ軍務局長ニナツタ時ハ既に現地デ  
ハ決定シ着任ノ時ハ宣言ノアツタ時デシタ其當時  
甲送リニハ現地ニ於ケル治安維持ノ爲メニハ現地  
民ノ熱情ニ任セルヨリ外ナシトノ願真軍司令官ノ  
治安確保ノタメノ意見ヲ尊重シ政府ハ干涉スルコ  
トナク暫ラク成リ行キニ任スコト、ナツタトイフ  
事デアツタ陸軍ハ政府ノ方針ニ従ヒ且ツ大臣ノ旨  
ヲ体シ急速ナル兵亂終熄ト治安維持トニ任ジ且ツ  
新政體ノ成立ニ伴フ變化ニ應ズル研究ヲシ内閣ニ  
ハ内閣書記官長ヲ委任長トスル關係各省ヨリ出タ  
ル委員ニヨル委員會ガアツテ對策ヲ練ツテ居マシタ  
元來自分ガ軍務局長ニ就任シタ主要ナル任務ハ當  
時三月事件トカ十月事件トカ江ニ於ケル不祥事件  
ガ起ツタ後デアツタノデ今後此ノ如キ事件ガ再ビ  
起ラス様般重ニ之ヲ防止スル事デアリマシタ  
即チ就任ノ時大臣ハ特ニ自分ニ軍ガ亂レナイヤウ  
ニ軍ノ素質ヲプロシヤ型又ハ當時流行ノフアツシ  
ヨ型ニ走ラス様心懸ケ何處マデモ皇軍ノ眞價發揮  
ヲ第一トスル旨ヲ指示サレマシタ



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六、當時國軍ハ荒木大臣ノ方針ニ従ヒ色々ノ事件ニ關  
係ノアツタ者ヤ激烈ニ時局ヲ憤慨スル者ヲ中央ヨ  
リ地方ニ轉任セシメテ要路ニハ大臣ノ方針ヲヨク  
了解シ執行スル穩健ナル將校ヲ充ツル事ニナツテ  
居タノデ自分モ就任以來人事ノ刷新ニ協力シ且青  
年將校ヤ憤慨分子ヲ説得シタリ鎮メタリスルコト  
ニ努力誠シマシタ

ヤ、從ツテ自分就任後三ヶ月目ニ三、一五事件が起リ  
マシタガ幸ニシテ國軍ノ將校ハ一人モ之ニ參加  
シマセンデシタ唯士官學校ノ生徒ガ若干名參加  
シマシタガ之ハ外部カラノ誘惑ニヨツタモノデア  
リマス

自分ハ同夜直チニ首相官邸ニ出ケツケ陸相ノ命ニ  
ヨツテ此大衝動ニヨリ相當動搖シテ居タ軍人及地  
方ノ熱狂ヲ抑ヘタ又一面強硬論者中ニハ此際殺  
令ヲ布クベシトノ意見モアツタガ之ヲ排シテ事件  
ノ擴大ヲ防グ事ニ成功シマシタ

陸相ハ國軍將校ハ參加シナカッタガ士官學校生徒  
ガ參加シタ以上政治上ノ實ヲ貢フベキデアルトシ  
テ辭職サレ後任トシテ朗修軍司令官ノ赤松十郎大  
將ヲ長官デ推薦シタガ赤松大將ガ總理大臣ニ對シ自分

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へ外地ニアツテ時局ノ認識未ダ十分デナイカラト  
云ツテ固辞シタノデ賁藤總理ハ荒木大府ニ滿洲事  
變急速處理ノ爲メニ在ゲテ留任ヲ請フト懇請サレ  
タノデ遂ニ御意サレタ  
然ルニ事件ノ真相ヲ誤解セル者ヤ又本齋陸相ノ精  
神ニ共鳴セル者ノ中ニモ此御意ニ對シテハ痛烈ナ  
ル批判ガアリマシタガ陸相ハ何等辯解モセズ計ラ  
レザルノ意アリ全ラ京ムルノ數リアリノ古語ヲ示  
サレ臥々トシテ滿洲事變ノ終息ニ邁進サレマシタ  
自分ハ當時ノ陸相ノ怒壯ナル態度ニハ真相ヲ知ル  
部下トシテ悲痛ナ感ヲ受ケマシタ  
ハ自分就任當時ノ滿洲其他ノ情勢ハ次ノ通りデアリ  
マス  
中華民國ハ蔣介石北伐ノ後又共黨肅正ノ後デハ  
アリマシタガ主權回復熱旺盛ノタメ排外運動強ク  
相當荒レテ唐タ滿洲モ邊境ノ治安良好ナラズ殊ニ  
學良始メ支那本部ノ絶エザル煽動デ一寸ノ油斷モ  
出来ナカッタ又ソ聯邦ノ極東ノ諸施設ガ着々進シ  
テ脅威ヲ感ズル事ガ多カッタガ我ニハ戦争ヲスル  
意志ハ毫モナク寧ロ遠カニ滿洲ノ兵力實動ヲ止ム  
ル意ニシタイトイフ陸相ノ方針ダツタノデ治安維

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持ノ爲メノ事件ノ處理ニモ少ナカラザル苦心ト工  
夫トヲ必要トシマシタ北滿ノ馬占山及呼蘭縣兩ノ  
森炳文ノ反は討伐ナド其一例デ參謀本部ハ相當ニ  
心シテ居マシタコトラ見受ケマスソノタメ前請ヘ  
最後ノ追討ヲセズ後進モ徹底的ニ包圍鐵滅モ出來  
ナカツタノデス  
又滿洲ガ承認セラレタ後ハ耳トシテハ新情勢ニ即應  
ズル治安維持ト新ニ生ズベキ國防上ノ責任トニ就  
テ滿洲口出現前ト異リ滿洲口ト責任ヲ分タナゲレ  
自バオラナカツタカラ滿洲口ト相手ニ請幕ヲ進メネ  
自バオラナカツタソコヲ夫レニ對スル兩口間ノ取極  
自メニ從テ万難ヲ處置シタ又新滿洲口關係カラ我が政  
府ノ對滿方針ニ對シテハ亦タニ其基礎薄弱ナル同  
口ニ對シテハ特ニ治安維持ト國防上必要ナル處置  
ニ遺憾無キ様政府ニ要望シマシタ細部ハ外務省江  
大城及内閣トノ主裁者ノ協賛ニヨリマシ然而シテ  
意見ノ一致シタモノ、立案及實施手續者ハ用兵上  
外務省外務省ノ主管デアリマスカラ之レニ任セマシ  
タ然而シテ又ニ三ノ手ヲ用ヒテ滿洲口ト相手ニ  
十國相ノ滿洲事變ヲ防止ス兵亂ヲ急遽ニ終息  
スルニシテ又ニ三ノ手ヲ用ヒテ滿洲口ト相手ニ

Sept Dec 22/23

モシメントノ方針ハ其抱懷サレル皇軍精神ニ基ク  
モノデアリマシタ即チ陸相ハ日本ノ江陰ハ陛下ノ  
仁愛ノ大御心ニ従ヒ口ノ徳ヲ守ルタメニ存在スル  
モノデアルカラ戦争ハ絶對ニ避クベキモノデアル  
己ムヲ得ズ防衛戦争ラスル場合デモ勉メテ彼我ノ  
損害ヲ輕クシ戦争ニ依ル災害ヲ防止スベキモノデ  
アルト信ゼラレ且コレヲ實行セラレタノデアリマ  
ス 第一次上海事變ノ際停戦協定ナルヤ直ニ一兵  
モ動サズ引揚ゲテ將來ノ禍根ヲ斷ツタコトヤ熱河  
作戦當時平津ヲ指呼ノ間ニ眺メナガラ長城線デ停  
止セシメ値カニ長城線ヲ越ヘタモノモ二回迄引下  
ゲ越ニ堵沽協定ヲ締結シテ完全ニ滿洲事變ヲ終結  
處理シタノハ第一線閣員東軍ガヨク中央ノ意志ヲ体  
シタノニヨリマスガ又實ニ荒木陸相ト内閣總長官  
及ビ眞崎參謀次長ノ熱烈ナル後方ノ處理ニヨルモ  
ノデアリマス陸相就任以來此完全終結迄一年半ヲ  
要シテ居リマスガ私ガ体験シタ當時ノ實情ト又志  
門的ノ見地ヨリシテ當時ノ滿洲ノ實情日本ノ國內  
事情國際的事情ノ下デハ平和ヘノ解決ヘ之レ以上  
ノ好成績ヲ望ムコトハ出來ナイト信ジマス



十一、陸相ハ塘沽協定迄ハ一意兵亂ノ終熄ニ力ヲ  
サレマシタカ協定成立致シマスルヤ直チニ公  
格的施策ニ取リカ、リ其年ノ秋ノ初メヨリ五  
相會議テ外交長政問題ヲ檢討シ自ラ「緊急施  
策案」ト名稱ヲ附シタ國策要綱ヲ作成シ國內  
的ニハ左右兩派ノ區別ナク甚タシキ常習的ノ  
モノ以外犯罪人全部ヲ大赦シ國際的ニハ極東  
平和會議ヲ開催スル様ニ取り運び聯盟脫退後  
ノ列國トノ關係ヲ調整シ現狀認識ヲ求メ極東  
平和ヲ圖ラント凡ニル努力ヲ拂ハレマシタ

十二、然ルニ一九三四年一月肺炎ニ冒サレ危險期ハ  
過ギタガ重要時局ノ議會ニ病後充分ノ活動ガ  
出來ナイ事ハ申請カナイト云ツテ齋藤總理始  
メ他ノ閣僚ヤ我々下僚ノ熱誠ナル留任勸告ニ  
モ拘ラズ遂ニ一月二十三日荒木氏ノ國策要綱  
ニ就テ一應ノ理解ヲ持ツテ居タ眞崎、林兩大  
將ヲ後任ニ推薦シテ降職サレマシタガ林大將  
ガ後任ニナリマシタ

十三、然ルニ林陸相始メ政府ハ荒木大將ノ國策案ノ  
實現ニ何等ノ熱意ヲ示サズ議會モ再ビ低調ト  
ナリ觀望ヲ演ジ出シタ  
荒木大將ハ一ヶ月間ノ靜養ヲ終ヘテ熱海カラ  
歸京サレタガ此ノ有様ヲ見テ大イニ失望且憤  
慨サレ爾來重要國策ニ就テハ積極的ニ口ヲ出

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サレヌ様ニナリ外部ニアリテ國策強調ニ力ヲ  
盡サレテ居リマシタ

十四、荒木陸相ハ常ニ第一次世界大戦中ニ得ラレタ  
文明戦争ノ悲惨ナル体験ヲ語ラレ且國防ノ爲  
ノ軍備ニモ戦争觀ニモ獨特ノ考ヘヲ堅ク持タ  
レテ居タノデ普通一般ノ軍事施設ニハ餘リ興  
味ガアリマセンデシタ其主張ハ一國ノ國防ハ  
道義觀ノ卓越ヨリ出發セネバナラヌ  
日本古來ノ教ヘニ豊富ニコレガアル國防ヲ安  
全ニ保持スルニハ戦争本位テハイケナイ此道  
義ノ向上デアルト云フ主張テ惨害ノ回避戰時  
公法ノ違法ヲ始メ更ニ古來名將ノ行爲ヲ例證  
シテ上杉謙信ノ例等ヲ引イテ今一步戦争觀ニ  
人間味ヲ加フベシト主張サレテ居マシタ故ニ  
第一次大戦中落伍シタ貧弱ナル我陸軍々備ヲ  
獨立國トシテ世界大戦中ノ列國ノ裝備ニ近キ  
マデニ整備セントシタ大正十一、二年頃ノ決  
定計畫ハ賠償サレマシタガ事變テ之モ出來ズ  
却ツテ既定豫算ノ繰上等テ事變ノ急ハ間ニ合  
セマシタ位デス一切ハ滿洲事變ノ戦亂終熄後  
デナケレバトテソレニノミ没頭シテ何ニモ自  
已ノ持ツテ居ル理想ハ實現スルニ至リマセン  
デシタ 此間ニ種々下條カラノ策案ヲ出シマ



10

シタガ余リ熱心ニ研究セズ自己ノ持ツテ居タ  
信念實現ノ時マデハソノマヽニシテ置ケトイ  
フ風デアリマシタガ病氣デ途中ヤメラレタノ  
デ萬事ソノマヽニナリマシタ  
又ソ聯ノ極東施設ノ活潑化ニ就テハ多クノ情  
報ガ來テ居タケレドモ滿洲事變ノ終熄ノ處理  
ニ没頭ジテ居タシ又ソ聯トノ戰爭等考ヘテ居  
ナカツタカラ陸軍省トシテハ何等特別ノ施設  
ヲ爲サナカツタ  
又大臣ハ聯盟脫退後ノ世界ノ變局ニ對シ大イ  
ニ憂慮シ和平招來ニ對シ別ニ自己ノ信念ト抱  
負ヲ持ツテ居タカラ戰爭本位ノ積極施設ハ當  
然ナカツタ

十五、荒木陸相在任中ノ軍政改革ノ主ナルモノハ幹  
部候補生ノ納金制ヲ廢シタ事デシタ之ハ從來  
一年志願兵ハ相當ノ金額ヲ負擔シナケレバナ  
ラヌ爲貧富ノ差ニヨツテ有能ナ者モ志願ガ出  
來スト云フ狀態デアツタノデ兵役義務ノ機會  
均等ガ改正ノ目的デアリマシタ其外ニ除附請  
隊長トシテ多數ノ部下ヲ持チ而モ修養研究ノ  
機會ニ恵マレナイ者ノ後願ノ憂ヲ絶ツ事ガ肅  
軍ニモ軍ノ道德的存在トシテ專念セシムル爲  
ニモ必要ダトテ中隊長以上ニ特別加給ノ方法

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ヲ辭ズルト共ニ隊長ノ人選ヲ人格本位トスル  
事ニ改正サレマシタソシテ大体事變中デアリ  
マシタガ爲ニ一切ノ改革ハ手ヲ着クルニ至ラ  
ナカツタ次第デアリマス

十六、荒木大臣ハ軍ハ道德的存在トシテノ實ヲ舉グ  
ル事ニ主力ヲ注ガネバナラストシテ力ヲ注ガ  
レマシタ即チ第一次歐洲大戦ニ從軍サレタ所  
感ニヨリ日本軍ハ嚴肅ニ戦争ノ墮落ヲ防止シ  
ナケレバナラスト無名ノ師ヲ起シタリ戦場ニ於  
ケル處處ナ行爲ヲナシタリ俘虜ヲ苛酷取扱ツ  
タリシテハナラスト之等ニ就テハ國際條約遵守  
ハ固ヨリノ事今一步進ンデ毒瓦斯ヤ細菌戰ノ  
研究ヤ不具疑疾トナリ易キ兵器ノ使用制限等  
ニ就テハ意見ナク世界ニ警告スル様デナケレ  
バナラスト云ヒ且實行サレタ「勝ツテ敵ニ怨  
マレズ駐ツテ居民ニ慕ハレヨ」ト云フノガ大  
臣ノ常ニ致ヘラレタ軍指導ノ標語デアツタ  
兵營ノ神聖化モ随分強ク主張サレタガ積弊ハ  
中々一朝一夕ニ矯メルコトハ出来ナカツタ  
刀劍ハ殺人劍デハナク活人劍デナケレバナラ  
スト戒メテ荒ム氣ヲ蓄付ケル様ニ指導サレマ  
シタ

十七、學校教練ニツイテハ荒木陸軍大臣時代ハ從來



12

形式的ニナツテ居タモノヲ是正シタ以外何等  
新タナル施策ハアリマセンデシタ從來學校ト  
軍トノ關係ニ種々ノ誤解ガアツタノヲ一掃シ  
テ寧ロ軍事教育ハ精神的ニ皇軍ノ眞面目ヲ發  
揮スベキ道德的存在タル自覺ヲ與フルト共ニ  
兵役期間短縮ノ補助的訓練ヲ合理化シタ

十八、荒木大臣ハ他人ノ言論出版等ニ就テハ輿論ノ  
聲トシテ自己反省ノ資料トシテ居ラレマシタ  
從ツテ如何ナル言論等ニ對シテモ壓迫ヲ加ヘ  
ル様ナ事ハナカッタ其爲相當外部ヨリ種々ノ  
目的ノ爲メニ個人的ニ又ハ軍ヲ目標トシテ中  
傷サレルコトモアリ我等下僚ハ大臣ノ寛大ヲ  
憤慨スル事サヘアリマシタ  
新聞班ニ於テモ大臣ノ方針ヲ体シ行キ過ギタ  
者ニ對シテモ好意的懇談的ニ處置シテ權力的  
彈壓方針ヲ採ラナカッタト記憶致シマス

Long Sec 2241

Log doc. 2241

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）八月二十日

於 東京

供述者

山 岡 重 厚 印

右（ ）當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名  
捺印シタルコトヲ證明シマス

同日於

立會人 谷 田 勇 印

宣 誓 書

良心ニ從ヒ眞實ヲ述べ何事ヲモ隠秘セズ又何事ヲ  
モ附加セザルコトヲ誓フ

署名捺印

山 岡 重 厚 印



19. Dec 11 2298

CRIMES	COUNTRY & TIME PERIOD	TIME	INCIDENTS	APPROX.	REMARKS
COMMON PLAN AND CONSPIRACY	East Asia (1937-1945)	1 Jan 1937 - 2 Sept 1945	Chinese invasion of Manchuria		
	Manchuria, Mongolia		Chinese invasion of Mongolia		
	China		Chinese invasion of China		
	16 countries		Chinese invasion of 16 countries		
	Among Asia Countries		Chinese invasion of Asia		
	CHINA		Chinese invasion of China		
	U.S.A.		Chinese invasion of U.S.A.		
	BRITAIN		Chinese invasion of Britain		
	AUSTRALIA		Chinese invasion of Australia		
	NEW ZEALAND		Chinese invasion of New Zealand		
PLAN AND PREPARATION	CANADA		Chinese invasion of Canada		
	INDIA		Chinese invasion of India		
	PHILIPPINE		Chinese invasion of Philippines		
	HOLLAND		Chinese invasion of Holland		
	FRENCH-CHINA		Chinese invasion of French-China		
	SIAM		Chinese invasion of Siam		
	SOVIET UNION		Chinese invasion of Soviet Union		
	MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA	1931-9-18	Chinese invasion of Manchuria, Mongolia		
	CHINA	1937-7-7	Chinese invasion of China		
	U.S.A.	1941-12-7	Chinese invasion of U.S.A.		
INITIATED WAR	PHILIPPINE		Chinese invasion of Philippines		
	BRITAIN		Chinese invasion of Britain		
	FRENCH INDO-CHINA	1940-9-22	Chinese invasion of French Indo-China		
	SIAM	1941-12-7	Chinese invasion of Siam		
	CHANG-KU-FENG	1945-8-15	Chinese invasion of Chang-Ku-Feng		
	NOMONHAN	1937-6-26	Chinese invasion of Nomonhan		
	MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA	1931-9-18	Chinese invasion of Manchuria, Mongolia		
	CHINA	1937-7-7	Chinese invasion of China		
	U.S.A.	1941-12-7	Chinese invasion of U.S.A.		
	PHILIPPINE		Chinese invasion of Philippines		



1931-9-18	MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA
1937-7-7	CHINA
1941-12-7	U.S.A.
"	PHILIPPINE
"	BRITAIN
1940-9-22	FRENCH INDO-CHINA
1941-12-	SIAM
1938 July and August	CHANG-KU-FENG
1937 - summer	NOMONHAN
1931-9-18 — 1945-7-2	MANCHURIA, MONGOLIA
1937-7-7 — 1945-7-2	CHINA
1941-12-7 — 1945-6-2	U.S.A.
"	PHILIPPINE
"	BRITAIN
"	HOLLAND
1941-9-22 and about Aug	FRENCH INDO-CHINA
1941-12-7 — 1945-1-2	SIAM
1938 summer	CHANG-KU-FENG
1937 — 1945 — 7-2	NOMONHAN
Unofficial plan and conspiracy in peace time of overthrowing Empire of US. Main East Asia War	31
" Same as above, after hostility began	38
1941-12-7 — 1945 ending	PEARL HARBOR
"	KOTABAL
1941-12-7 — 1945 "	HONG KONG
1941-12-7 — 1945 "	SHANGHAI, PETELLE (BUT)
1941-12-7 — 1945 "	DAVAO
Concealed plan & conspiracy of massacring POW's captured at Bataan and Corregidor	45
1937-12-12 and afterwards	NANKING
1938-10-27 and about there	CANTON
1948-6-18	HANKOW
1948-6-18	CHANGSHA
1948-7-3	KANYANG

GROUP 2 — MURDER



CHINA	1937-7-7 — 1945-9-2
U. S. A.	1941-12-7 — 1945-9-2
PHILIPPINE	"
BRITAIN	"
HOLLAND	"
33 FRENCH INDO-CHINA	1940-9-22 and about 1945
34 SIAM	1941-12-7 — 1945-9-2
35 CHANG-KU-FENG	1938 Summer
36 NOMONHAN	1937 - Summer
37	Concocted plan and conspiracy in peace time of murdering troops of US Marine But Held Secret 1940-6-1 — 1941-12-5
38	" Same as above, after hostility began "
39 PEARL HARBOUR	1941-12-7 — 0755 Hours
40 KOTABAL	1941-12-7 — 0025 "
41 HONG KONG	1941-12-7 — 0800 "
42 SHANGHAI, <sup>The</sup> PETLEI(Brit)	1941-12-8 — 0300 "
43 DAVAO	1941-12-8 — 1000 "
44	Concocted plan & Conspiracy of massacring POW, Surrendered Personnel and Civilians 1931-9-18 — 1945-9-2
45 NANKING	1937-12-12 and after wards
46 CANTON	1938-10-2 "
47 HANKOW	1938-10-27 and about 1945
48 CHANGSHA	1944-6-18 "
49 KANYANG	1944-3-8 "
50 KWEILIN RYUCHOW	1944-11-10 "
51 NOMONHAN	1939 - SUMMER
52 CHANG-KU-FENG	1938 - July and August
53	Concocted plan & Conspiracy of violating Customs and laws of 1945 1931-9-18 — 1945-12-7 — 1945-9-2
54	Ordering, authorizing, possible violation of law "
55	Ordering, authorizing or condoning of acts, means or to promote or conduct which were against "

Refugees etc. by League of Nations meeting to debate of Chinese situation	A - 2	7-22	
Emigration into Canton	A - 2	10-21	
Reinforced 3 strategic points: Hanchow, Hankow, Hongkong	A - 2	10-22	
Domestic declaration of Japanese inviolable policy	A - 9	11-3	
Imperial Conference held at Imperial Palace to discuss emergency situation	A - 2	11-4	
Invited no territorial acquisition in China, recognition for strategic necessity	C - 18	12-2-17	Remained as Education Minister (K. HIRANUMA Cabinet)
Japan-Italy Cultural Agreement (AKIRA - AVANCI)		2-23	Chief committee for Mobilization of National Spirit
Memorandum on Peace (Peace signed 9-14)	A - 8	5-20	
Imperial Rescript to young people of Japan		5-22	
Japan USA Commercial Treaty, abrogated		7-26	
Asia Pacification Memorial Day fixed at 1st of every month (opposite Sunday)			
Germany - Japan - new aggression Pact signed		8-24	Resigned Education Minister (H. ABE Cabinet)
Declared no state to take on mediating relations between Germany and China	A - 7, C - 19		
European War II broke out (Britain declared War against Germany)			
Peace Bond at home, but no abrogation of aggression in foreign (involuntary)			
Imperial Conference held on 10th of October			
League of Nations called forth at the League session			
New Nationalist Govt established in China (also N. China Political Committee)			
Guaranteed that Japan desires maintenance of status quo of N.E. I.	C - 10		
Guaranteed no plan or intention of attacking N.E. I.	C - 11		
Abrogation of Treaty signed in 1911 by Japan to US re Pacific Islands	A - 10		
Germany occupied Poland (Poland surrendered 6-17)			
Chinese Nationalist President of Council Declared National Political State			
Japan-Siam Friendly Relations Pact signed	A - 7		
Chinese National Policy made public (Foreign Minister Matsunaka declaring establishment of Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)		8-1	Joined Cabinet Council (12-3)
Japan-China Sino Chinese Negotiation started	A - 7	8-12	KONOYE 2 (12-3)
Essential principle of New Political State decided at Cabinet Meeting		8-12	
Communist Ministry appointed to N.E. I. in consultation with Japanese	A - 11	8-12	
Successful March into North China Sino Chinese	A - 7 (12-3, 22, 23)	8-12	
Talks started at Berlin	A - 7	8-12	
Grand Rule Assistance Association organized	A - 6	10-12	
Formally recognized Chinese Nationalist Govt (KONOYE 2)	A - 7	11-30	
Japanese Government established in strategic action of Sino Chinese	A - 7	12-1	
Japan's economic plan to Asian E. I. dispute signed	A - 7	12-11	
Guaranteed Japan would not attack Britain, USA, N.E. I.	C - 12	12-25	
Continued Negotiable Pact signed (Matsunaka at Berlin 3-26)	A - 5	4-15	
America-Japan Talks started	A - 9	4-15	
Germany-Soviet War broke out (Hitler, K. HIRANUMA, KONOYE 2)	E - 1-4	6-22	
Bliss Conference between Govt. and K. H. R.	E - 5	6-22	
Imperial Conference Meeting	E - 6	7-2	
Imperial Conference	E - 6	7-2	
Troops stationed in South China Sino Chinese	A - 7	7-21	
USA news from news on U.S. (Economic Bureau received)	A - 7	7-25	
Thought-Deliberation Council Meeting	E - 7	8-7	
Cabinet Meeting	E - 8	8-22	
Imperial Conference (Execution of National Policy)	E - 9	9-6	
Senior Political Retainers Conference	E - 10	10-17	
Modification of Anti-Communism Pact with secret provisions	A - 7	11-25	
Warrior Conference between Government - K. H. R.	E - 11	11-25	
Senior Retainers Conference	E - 12	11-29	
Imperial Conference (War against USA Britain Holland denied)	E - 13	12-1	
Cabinet Meeting	E - 14	12-1	
Requested Germany Italy declaration of War against USA also prohibition	E - 15	12-1	
Germany Italy declaration of War against USA also prohibition	E - 15	12-1	
Japan-Italy agreement for prohibiting independent peace		12-5	
Attack on N.E. I.	A - 7 (12-11, 12-12)	12-11	
Grand Rule Assistance Political Assoc. organized	A - 6	5-18	(C)
Potsdam Declaration		7-26	
Imperial Broadcast for cessation of War		8-6	
Signed Surrender Instrument in Missouri		8-2	







1945-1946

Country	Time	Incident	Remarks
Common Plan and Conspiracy			
Group 1 - Against Peace			
1. China	1945-1946	Chinese Nationalist Government (KMT) vs. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) civil war.	1945-1946
2. U.S.A.	1945-1946	U.S. military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
3. Britain	1945-1946	British military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
4. Australia	1945-1946	Australian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
5. New Zealand	1945-1946	New Zealand military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
6. Canada	1945-1946	Canadian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
7. India	1945-1946	Indian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
8. Philippine	1945-1946	Philippine military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
9. Holland	1945-1946	Dutch military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
10. French Indo-China	1945-1946	French military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
11. Siam	1945-1946	Siam military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
12. Soviet Union	1945-1946	Soviet military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
13. Manchuria, Mongolia	1945-1946	Manchurian and Mongolian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
14. China	1945-1946	Chinese military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
15. U.S.A.	1945-1946	U.S. military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
16. Philippine	1945-1946	Philippine military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
17. Britain	1945-1946	British military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
18. French Indo-China	1945-1946	French military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
19. Siam	1945-1946	Siam military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
20. China-Ku-Feng	1945-1946	Chinese military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
21. Nomonhan	1945-1946	Manchurian and Mongolian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946
22. Manchuria, Mongolia	1945-1946	Manchurian and Mongolian military presence in China and support for the KMT.	1945-1946